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The balance of power between the individual and the government has been tipped in favor
of the government. Recent advances in technology have led to the commoditization of personal
information. The vast amounts of information collected and the ease with which they can be
transferred to other parties has led to the rise of personal profile data mining. Due to Supreme
Court decisions in the 1970s, the government can easily use or buy these profiles. Therefore,
personal privacy from agents of government is being reduced due to data mining.
This paper will explore the causes, implications, and potential solutions to this problem. It
will explain the value of privacy and why it should be a value that is protected. Then, it will
discuss the primary problems associated with data mining, particularly how those problems
will impact individuals when the information obtained is used by the government. Next it will
describe the current landscape of privacy protections. Finally, it will examine many proposed
solutions using a stakeholer/method perspective model to comparatively analyze the solutions.
With that analysis, it will describe the findings and implications of that analysis.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
The Fourth Amendment has, since its adoption in 1791, protected people in the United
States from unreasonable search and seizure. New technologies have exacerbated many grey
areas in the law by allowing law enforcement officials new ways to gain information about the
individuals they are investigating. However, perhaps the most troubling impact of technology
on legal protections to privacy is third party data brokers, who sell large amounts of per-
sonal information they have gathered to law enforcement entities. This paper will explore the
role of these private data mining companies in government surveillance and law enforcement
proceedings and the current and potential impact they have on personal privacy.
1.1 Constitutional Protection Overview
The Constitution of the United States exists to outline the fundamental rules by which
the US government will operate. One primary goal is to protect citizens from government by
limiting the power of government. The Bill of Rights prohibits the government from infringing
on fundamental freedoms, such as free speech and citizens’ rights to due process. The Fourth
amendment, which ensures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmations,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The data flow process between an individual and a public entity, such as the federal gov-
ernment or local law enforcement, instituted in US society as desbribed by that amendment is
2illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Data Flow Model
In this diagram, the arrows depict the flow of information about an individual to the public
entity trying to collect information. All the information will originate from the individual,
whether directly by his actions or indirectly by his iteractions with other entities. When
the public entity attempts to collect the information, it must go through the following basic
process:
1. Determine what protections exist for the information
2. Attempt appropriate bypass mechanisms to circumvent those protections
3. If successful, collect information
Take, for example, the situation where the local police suspect and individual committed a
crime. Some informtion bout the suspect can be gathered freely because it is not protected,
like asking his neighbor about the character of the individual. However, if evidence supporting
the police’s claim could be found inside the individual’s home, the police cannot freely enter,
due to Fourth amendment protection. To bypass this protection, the police can attempt to
obtain a warrant from a local judge, which requires them to demonstrate why they have valid
3cause to believe they could find evident there. If they are given the warrant, they are able
to enter the home to collect the information they seek. If not, the flow of protected data is
stopped.
The process depicted in the diagram is very simple, and taken at face value it oversimplifies
the world because much of the problem lies in the first step; that is, in determining if the
information is protected or not. In order for the information to be protected as defined by
the court, there must be a “reasonable expectation of privacy” for the information, which is
defined by a two-prong test:
• The government must contravene an individual’s actual, subjective expectation of privacy
• That expectation of privacy must be reasonable, in the sense that society in general
would recognize it as such
So, the inquiry into whether or not information about an individual is protected by the Fourth
amendment is comprised of the following questions (1) does the individual expect privacy in
this situation and (2) does society recognize that expectation as valid?
An individual can have a reasonable expectation of privacy to information outside the
home. The following examples will illustrate cases involving information with some public
element and the decision as to whether or not the information was considered private:
• In Katz v United States, the plaintiff argued that a conversation inside a public phone
booth should not be able to be wiretapped without a warrant if the user attempts to en-
sure privacy. By shutting the door, the person inside isolated himself from eavesdropping,
and therefore enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court agreed, holding
that the Fourth amendment protects people, not places, and by closing the door, Katz
maintained a resasonable expectation that his conversation would not be overheard.
• In Kyllo v United States, the police took pictures of a private home from public space
across the street using thermal imaging equipment. From these images, they determined
that the homeowner was growing marijuana plants and arrested him. The Court ruled
4that because the technology was not available to the general public, the search was
presumptively unreasonable.
• In California v Greenwood, garbage left on public property outside the home in order
to be collected is not protected. Therefore, agents of government can search garbage
without a warrant so long as it is in public space, like being on the curb.
• In Smith v Maryland. The police obtained the phone numbers dialed by Smith from his
telephone company, who had installed a pen register at police request. Smith argued
this was an unreasonable search. The Court stated that individuals knowingly disclose
the numbers they are calling to the company so the call can be placed and so accurate
billing can occur. The Court then found that an individual did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when he willingly gave up information to a third party.
Smith v Maryland was decided in 1979, and its effects are the main source of the inquiry in
this article. Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 regulated the use
of pen registers, the third party doctrine of this ruling still remains in use. Unless otherwise
protected by statute, an individual does not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy to any
information voluntarily given to a third party.
Advances in information technology have led to an explosion in the use of personal infor-
mation. Information can be collected, stored, transported, reorganized, and analyzed in ways
that are cheaper, easier, and faster than were imagined in 1979. These technological changes,
coupled with a lack of cohesive privacy policy, have left individuals in the US almost powerless
to protect their information from agents of the government. The only legal protections awarded
to individuals exist in separate and disjoint pieces of legislation guarding particular types of
information and its uses. Protected classes of information include medical, financial, motor
vehicle records, and communications. The absence of protection allows agents of government
to obtain large amounts of personal information without experiencing any Fourth amendment
requirement to supply a reason for needing it. The remainder of this paper will further explore
the implications of this situation.
51.2 The Look of the New World
The improvement of information technology in recent decades has greatly altered the way
in which US society treats information. Now more than ever, information is a commodity that
is bought and sold, and the government is no exception. However, in order to demonstrate the
way in which this change affects individuals, the types of information in question must first be
defined. In this analysis, two classifications of information are used:
• Protected information: Information that is unattainable or unusable by government
agents. Information can be protected in two ways:
1. Constitutional prohibition or legal statute. Information in this category will require
some type of procedure (i.e. a warrant) to legally obtain it.
2. Infeasibility of collection. Information in this category will require some type of new
process or technology to make its collection simpler.
• Unprotected information. Information that is freely able to be collected by government
agents as they are interested and capable of doing so.
The commoditization of information has led to a society where individuals expect to disclose
information about themselves every day. In fact, it is nearly impossible to fully participate in
today’s society without doing so. Stores ask for email addresses at checkout counters. Online
newspapers ask viewers to disclose their location and income level. Newly purchased software
programs require that the owner register them before using them. These requests have become
so commonplace that individuals release information without a second thought. By simply
participating in the basic advantages of society, people in the US give up their right to privacy
because, except for a few exceptions (banking, medical, etc.), information held by third parties
is considered to be unprotected information.
This effect is depicted in Figure 1.2, which updates the previous model of personal infor-
mation flow.
6Figure 1.2 New Data Flow Model
In this image, the traditional paths for information still exist; however, a new path for
information is provided - through the Private entities block. Information is supplied by the
user to many third parties, aggregated, and finally given or sold to government agents.
In short, the effect of technology in light of the Smith decision is that information that
was traditionally protected is rapidly moving into the unprotected category, and this greatly
affects the balance of power between the individual and the government.
1.2.1 Issues in the New World
Individuals suffer several real losses in the new world. These are:
• Lack of awareness of what information about themselves is being collected
• Lack of awareness when or why informtion about them is being gathered
• Inability to correct erroneous information
7• Inability to remain anonymous in daily activities
• Inability to choose which behaviors are worth the privacy risk
1.2.2 If we follow this path
Many discussions of privacy from government quickly devolve into suggestions or claims
that the current system will ultimately become the Orwellian notion of Big Brother and the
Thought Police. However, Solove described a different potential reality, one much more like
the situation in Franz Kafka’s The Trial. He said:
Kafka’s novel chronicles the surreal nightmare of a person who is unexpectedly
informed that he is under arrest but given no reason why. A bureaucratic court
maintains a dossier about him, but he has no access to this information. Through-
out the rest of the novel, the protagonist desperately attempts to find out why the
Court is interested in his life, but his quest is hopeless - the Court is too clandestine
and labyrinthine to be fully understood[38].
It seems to be evident that our potential future is much more like that of Kafka than Orwell.
Larry Hunter, a computer scientist, observed the following in 1985:
Our revolution will not be in gathering data - don’t look for TV cameras in your
bedroom - but in analyzing the information that is already willingly shared[23].
Without some control over that system, we risk becoming a society where everyone knows
everything about everyone else, but no one knows how they got it, what it means, or how to
fix mistakes. This will not only upset the balance of power between the individual and the
government - the individual will no longer have any power at all.
1.3 What to expect
This thesis will explore the impact data mining is having on privacy from agents of govern-
ment. First, it will examine what exactly privacy is and why it should be examined. Then, it
8will discuss theory of information, knowledge, and data mining to expose the risks inherent in
today’s data-driven world. Next it will survey the current landscape of privacy protection in
the United States and the problems that exist today. Finally, it will analyze several proposed
solutions using a two-dimensional stakeholder/method perspective model. This model will help
place the solutions on a relative values scale, which will be used to draw out deeper meaning
about future privacy protections.
9CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
The topic of privacy has been discussed on many different levels throughout history. It
can be examined as an intrinsic philosophical concept relating to identity. It is also a societal
construct denoting a place where each individual can hide from the burdens of societal life. It
is a legal idea in that it provides a sphere of protection for individuals from the government.
Finally, it is also a technical goal to realize via innovation. The purpose of this literature
review is to examine overall attitudes and conceptions about privacy on two levels. First, it
will explore what privacy actually is and why privacy is a value at all. Second, it will examine
feelings towards privacy in society today.
2.2 What is privacy and why is it important?
Entire articles have been dedicated to simply attempting to define what exactly privacy
means. Not only does its definition vary by perspective, say legal versus philosophical inter-
pretations, but it may vary greatly within each school of thought. Below are a few definitions
of privacy that have been articulated:
• Privacy is the right to be let alone[44]
• Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others[45]
• Privacy is a basic human right and “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and
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reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.[41]”
• In political philosophy, the private world of introspection and the private pursuit of
economic interests versus the public world of action and speech[1]
What all of these concepts have in common is that privacy is something that is inherent
to each individual. It is a concept that allows us as people to form our own opinions and
choose whether or not to share them. It is a value that implicates the utmost sanctity of our
individual autonomy, and it is a value that is instrumental in a society that allows its citizens
to be individuals. Even though privacy cannot be defined, it is generally understood that if
individuals lose all privacy, they will lose some characteristic of their humanity.
2.3 How does society view privacy?
Most commonly, privacy is viewed as a social construction that keeps people and govern-
ment from bothering those who would prefer to be left alone. To be private is to be secluded.
First, there are a few sources that argue that privacy will become an antiquated concept,
and the current uproar about it is simply the unwillingness of society to embrace change. The
most notable author in this regard is David Brin, who proposed a transparent society where
everyone is watched, but everyone is also a watcher [3]. He argues that today’s world of secrets
and realms of solitude gives space for people of ‘bad intent’ to do harm, whereas as it becomes
more transparent, the society will also become more enlightened. He argues that individuals
will feel embarassments because everything people do will be in the open, but because everyone
will be vulnerable and watched the social benefits by far outweigh the small personal sacrifice.
Another common construct is the view that privacy is about a balance of power between
the government and the individual[21, 30]. When discussing privacy in the societal and legal
context, such as in this paper, this is the most useful construction. It demonstrates that
privacy is a value, but not an absolute one. It competes against other valid interests. Just as
participating in society as an individual usually causes some loss in privacy due to a loss of
isolation, empowering the government to accomplish the task of policing security requires that
11
they be able to intrude on the private space to enforce those rules if they need to. The term
‘balance’ is very appropriate because it invokes important mental imagery - a scale. In order
to function as a cohesive society comprised of autonomous beings, a balance must be struck
between the powers of the government and the rights of the individual.
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CHAPTER 3. Information and Data Mining
3.1 Information Theory
3.1.1 Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom
To start, it is important for the purposes of this inquiry to understand what can be learned
about a person and specifically what a certain level of comprehension implies. To accomplish
this, detailed definitions of data, information, knowledge, and wisdom will be used to be clear
about what exactly is being described[2, 5, 7].
• Data: a fact without further relation to anything else, therefore having no meaning or
value because of lack of context and interpretation.
• Information: data that is somehow related to something else to be useful or provide
meaning.
• Knowledge: application of organized information to infer or predict something by recog-
nizing patterns
• Wisdom: deeper understanding of the knowledge, grasping principles rather than pat-
terns
This structure is called the DIKW hierarchy. Basically, it describes a system of different levels
of understanding. Some descriptions relate DIKW to a pyramid, like Maslov’s hierarchy of
needs where one level must build upon another.
The breakdown of the characterization of how facts and learning relate will be vital in
interpreting the topic of privacy in the context of the Information Age. Since this paper
focuses on the uses of data and information to gain knowledge and wisdom by government
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agents, the example below is set in a law enforcement scenario.
Data: A woman bought a gun.
Information: The woman who bought the gun very recently discovered that her husband
was unfaithful.
Knowledge: Spouses are often very upset after discovering such news and may be prone
to violence against the spouse. Therefore, the woman may have bought the gun to shoot her
husband.
Wisdom: Spouses tend to be upset in this situation because they view infidelity as a
violation of the sacred promise that they made to each other in getting married.
As it may be obvious, only the level of knowledge is really vital for law enforcement to do its
job in this scenario. Once the pattern recognition occurs, the police are likely able to provide
the adequate protection. In the data mining context, the level of wisdom and knowledge will
be combined to one level that signifies deeper understanding of the situation, whether it be
principles or patterns, due to analysis of the information available.
3.1.2 Can a computer know anything?
In a discussion about email privacy in the law of imputed knowledge, a researcher argued
that electronic records should be considered part of the knowledge of the organization that
can access them instantly[4]. This law states that knowledge of an organization includes all
the knowledge of the principles of that organization, not just the knowledge that the principles
share with the organization. This is because the information is “ready-to-hand,” or could be
shared with that organization at a moment’s notice. This same principle applies to computer
records, because they can be searched almost instantly to provide the information that they
hold, even if the organization is not aware of it. However, this would not directly apply to
paper records, because a human must know they contents for the organization to be aware thay
they are there. Therefore, a computer does not really know anything, but the organization




Data mining is defined as the process of extracting hidden patterns from data. Put in the
DIKW context, the purpose of data mining is using data to gain knowledge, as shown in Figure
3.1.
Figure 3.1 DIKW model in Data Mining
Government data mining is commonly used in two ways: discovering a new pattern or
predicting future behavior based on past[40]. Knowledge discovery identifies patterns found in
the collected data to reveal some piece of additional information about an individual, a group,
or society. This is used commonly in research and business contexts to discover patterns,
such as in medical trials of new drugs or the effectiveness of marketing campaigns. Prediction
analyzes current information to infer something about the past, present, or future. This has
been used in government programs to predict likely terrorists, such as the Total Information
Awareness program by the CIA[? ].
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The data mining process consists of five major elements[27]:
• Acquire data and transform it to the appropriate format for the database
• Store and manage the data
• Provide data access to analysts
• Analyze the data using software
• Present the data and analysis in a useful format
These five steps let entities transform raw data about people to meaningful patterns. For ex-
ample, grocery stores often mine point of sale (POS) information to increase their profitability.
For example, they track what days, times, and in what combinations products are purchased
by customers. They may use this information to track which displays are most effective at
marketing, which items should be placed near each other because they are likely to be pur-
chased together, or on what days certain items should be full price because they are more
frequently purchased at that time.
Data mining obviously cannot discover patterns which do not exist, nor can it find patterns
from data that has not been collected. Nevertheless, the effect of data mining is increasing
exponentially in today’s society. The amount of digital information in existence doubled in the
three years before 2003[15]. In addition, innovations leading to improved processing power,
data storage, data capture, and analysis are increasing the usefulness and effectiveness of data
mining.
Christopher Slobogin, a law professor at Vanderbilt University, identified three basic modes
of data mining performed by law enforcement[35]:
1. Target-driven data mining, which is also known as subject-based data mining. This is a
search to obtain information about a particular person
2. Match-driven data mining. This is a search to determine if a particular person has already
been identified as a person of interest. An example of this is when an airline passenger’s
identity is compared to those names on the no-fly list to determine his eligibility to fly.
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3. Event-driven data mining, which is also known as pattern-based surveillance. This is a
search to try to discover the perpetrator of a past or future event.
3.2.1 Data Mining in Society
In today’s society, individuals create multitudes of data every day. The following entities
are examples of those that save data for typical daily activities:
• Cell phone companies log every call make, its length, and probably the GPS location of
the phone when it was placed
• ISPs log every web site visited
• Email providers log email messages, including sender and recipient
• Credit card companies record any charges made
• Libraries, movie rental places, etc. record rental history
• Banks record many business transactions, like ATM withdrawals and checks
• Utility companies monitor electricity and gas usage
In addition, public records describe many of the interactions between individuals and society.
For example,
• Births, deaths, and marriages
• Criminal and civil court proceedings
• Motor vehicle registration
• Property ownership records
The knowledge that can be obtained from the aggregate of all the information that one person
will produce, particularly over time, can be very revealing. Not only the person’s associations
and business dealings, but also religious and political affiliations, interests, health, finances,
lifestyle, and psychology may be ascertainable from intensive data mining. A person may feel
17
less exposed purchasing a self-help book from Amazon because other people may not witness
them doing so in the moment, but that individual may not realize that not only does Amazon
remember that purchase, but it may sell the record of the purchase to marketers who target
people with self-help interests.
However, the issue of privacy from business and data mining for marketing has been ex-
plored by many other people and is not the issue here. Instead, the focus is the impact this
practice has had on the government’s use of private information.
3.2.2 Data Mining Issues
Data mining methods can greatly increase the ability of law enforcement to prevent and
prosecute crime, whether it is fraud or terrorism. However, each of the methods are prone to
the following challenges.
3.2.2.1 Analytical errors
Three problems lead to errors in the analysis of data mining.
• Data inaccuracy. Data mining often incorporates data from multiple sources, the ac-
curacy of which is not always verified. Incorrect data can have huge impacts on the
analysis of the information. For example, credit reports are frequently used to determine
eligibility for financial credit for loans or credit cards. However, in 2004 approximately
1 in 4 credit reports were found to contain errors serious enough to result in a denial
of credit, employment, or housing[6]. These errors occur in a variety of ways, from the
mis-entering of information, mistaken identity, or even identity theft.
• Incomplete information. Data mining gains knowledge by analyzing information, but it
often does so with only a subset of the total data that describes the situation, which
could lead to misinterpretation. This problem occurs in making judgments in life all the
time. In data mining, incomplete information could lead to a distorted analysis by a
computer or an analyst.
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• Difficulty creating accurate profiles and effective algorithms. This is a problem that
primarily affects event-driven data mining, which attempts to determine likely candidates
for the perpetrators of past or even future crimes. In order to accomplish this goal, the
analyst must determine what the distinguishing characteristics of individuals who would
commit crimes and only those individuals.
Figure 3.2 depicts how a target-driven data mining operation proceeds from the standpoint
of a piece of data. The raw data is matched to an identity (ie, correlated to a subject) and stored
as information. The piece of information about the subject in question is then combined with
other information supposedly about that same subject. The result is the ability to determine
whether or not the individual meets the criteria.
Figure 3.2 Target Driven Data Flow
This type of process occurs every day across the United States, such as when a credit report
is computed. The credit report contains data mined from various sources, like bank account
information and credit uses and abuses. This process is actually very difficult to complete
without error. Each step has some degree of uncertainty, and therefore introduces room for
error. Figure 3.3 depicts some of the questions that become apparent at each step.
The three main problems described at the beginning of this section could cause an unde-
sirable result at the end of this mining process:
• Data inaccuracy: The wrong identity could be matched to data, such as when identity
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Figure 3.3 Target Driven Data Flow with Comments
thieves open credit cards using someone else’s name. The individual will be associated
with reckless spending he did not do, which could harm his ability to get credit.
• Incomplete information: If a match was done incorrectly, this person could have some
outstanding debt that was not attributed to him because the identity information was
incorrect. Therefore, the bank may be unaware that this person has a history of financial
delinquency, therefore decreasing their desirability as a loan customer.
• Difficulty creating accurate profiles and effective algorithms: In order to maximize profits
and minimize losses, the bank is interested in developing a profile that will allow them to
select customers who will be able to pay the loan on time and give them the maximum
amount of money that they can afford. This requires the bank to develop profiles to
determine who those customers are and how much money that is in their cases. Getting
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this process wrong could mean that the bank will lose money on unreliable customers or
simply that they could have earned more money by loaning a larger amount.
3.2.2.2 Inference Problem
In some data collection systems, the desired knowledge is the large-scale trends, not the
individual ones. Therefore, these systems may anonymize the data in order to protect privacy.
However, it is sometimes possible to infer private information from anonymized aggregate data.
This is the inference problem[8]. Take, for example, a politician who polls registered voters to
determine who is likely to vote for him and who is not. He may group the voters into categories
of race, gender, wealth, profession, or location, in order to try and determine trends. However,
when analyzing the results, it may be possible to identify the only African-American woman
engineer making between 50,000 and 70,000 annually living in Ames, Iowa. In this instance, by
collecting anonymous information about voters’ preferences and classifications on a large scale,
the researcher can identify the vote of a single person. The privacy of one’s vote is a right that
is historically well-protected in American society, but data mining can potentially significantly
reduce or even remove the privacy of that choice. This is a serious problem because studies
have found certain combinations of data to be particularly revealing. One study determined
that 87% of the US population could be uniquely identified with only his 5-digit zip code,
birthdate, and gender[43].
3.2.2.3 Base Rate Fallacy
Another problem, which is particularly important for the use of data mining in legal con-
texts is known as the base rate fallacy. This refers to an issue that is found in the application
of detection theory to data mining. Detection theory relates to the ability to distinguish signal
from noise, for example, when detecting fraudulent use of credit cards in order to reduce the
amount of money they lose due to the illegal activity, since most credit card companies do
not hold the card owner to be liable for the costs. Therefore, they try to automatically detect
when a credit card is being illegally used. The classifications of card use are shown in Table
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3.1:
Table 3.1 Possible Detection Outcomes
Is the card being used fradulently?
Yes No
Does the system detect Yes True Positive False Positive
the use as fraud? No False negative True negative
Ideally, the system would correctly identify use in every instance, therefore only outputting
true positives and true negatives. However, this is impossible to implement in almost all cases.
Obviously, the credit card company is concerned about false negatives, because this means
they miss the fraudulent activity and must pay for the costs of the illegal purchases. However,
the credit card company is also worried about false positives because often the credit cards are
deactivated when fraud is detected. If this happens often to customers while they are using
their own cards, they may be likely to change companies because of the recurring inconvenience
of this fraud protection.
Often, balancing false negative and false positive rates is a tradeoff - reducing one means in-
creasing the other. Therefore, entities that use detection techniques must determine acceptable
thresholds for these rates.
Data mining to detect credit card fraud works well because credit card fraud is a pervasive
problem that occurs every day. In addition, it is easy for detection algorithms to generate
an accurate profile describing fraudulent behavior because so much fraud exists to be studied.
However, terrorist detection systems that work like the one described here are not always
effective. This problem occurs when the base rate, or number of true positives as a proportion
of the whole sample space, is too low. For example, detecting terrorist activity suffers from
the base rate fallacy. Terrorist plots occur so rarely and usually do not follow typical patterns,
rendering data mining for patterns related to terrorism ineffective. Bruce Schneier illustrated
this problem with the following hypothetical figures:
Let’s look at some numbers. We’ll be optimistic – we’ll assume the system has
a one in 100 false-positive rate (99 percent accurate), and a one in 1,000 false-
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negative rate (99.9 percent accurate). Assume 1 trillion possible indicators to sift
through: that’s about 10 events – e-mails, phone calls, purchases, web destinations,
whatever – per person in the United States per day. Also assume that 10 of them
are actually terrorists plotting.
This unrealistically accurate system will generate 1 billion false alarms for every
real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to
investigate 27 million potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per
month. Raise that false-positive accuracy to an absurd 99.9999 percent and you’re
still chasing 2,750 false alarms per day – but that will inevitably raise your false
negatives, and you’re going to miss some of those 10 real plots[33].
3.2.2.4 Lack of individual control
The questions in Figure 3.3 implicate more than just concerns for the bank in question in
ensuring that all qualified and zero unqualified customers get credit. The individual seeking
credit has a stake in the outcome as well. Despite the fact that the process is entirely about
the individual, they have no control.
A person’s information could be data mined for many different purposes, from credit anal-
ysis to marketing to terrorism detection. It can be used, shared, repackaged, manipulated, and
sold in an infinite number of ways. This leads people to ask:
• What data about them is being collected?
• Where does it come from? Is it even originated by them?
• How do they find out what information about them is out there?
• How can you correct any incorrect information?
• If data is collected for one legitimate purpose, what else will it be used for?
• Are there ways to reduce the generation and sharing of this information?
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The upcoming chapters will explore further the rights of the individual regarding his informa-
tion and evaluating the various solutions for guaranteeing those rights.
3.3 Government and Personal Information
It has been mentioned in several scenarios in this section that government agents try to
collect information to pretect the public welfare, such as detecting and stopping fraud and
preventing terrorism. Figure 3.1 depicted the application of the DIKW model in information
gathering techniques such as crime detection. In the introduction, I proposed two categories
of information in the law enforcement context:
• Protected information. Information that is unattainable or unusable by government
agents. Information can be protected in 2 ways:
1. Constitutional prohibition or legal statute. Information in this category will require
some type of procedure (i.e. a warrant) to legally obtain it.
2. Infeasibility of collection. Information in this category will require some type of new
process or technology to make its collection simpler.
• Unprotected information. Information that is freely able to be collected by government
agents as they are interested and capable of doing so.
Historically, a large amount of information was protected by the second method: infeasibil-
ity of collection. Tracking someone’s movements was difficult because someone had to follow
them, requiring a lot of time. Determining who a person corresponded with over the past six
months could only happen by asking the subject or finding every person that they corresponded
with - the post office does not log who sends letters to whom. Finding what bank someone
used in order to obtain his financial information required that an investigator contact every
bank in the area and ask if that individual is a customer. Now, all these pieces of information
are logged routinely and stored digitally. They can be collected, shared, and searched almost
instantly. Not only is it feasible to collect it, it is much easier to gather information by data
mining than using other traditional methods of investigation.
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The following chapter will go through privacy protections in law and practice in order to
determine exactly what types of information are protected. In doing so, it will demonstrate
how much information today is unprotected from use by government agents and what types of
problems this can cause for the individual.
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CHAPTER 4. Current Privacy Protection
Individual protections in the United States come from a variety of sources. First, the Con-
stitution enumerates those rights which are viewed to be fundamental in our society, and it
serves to establish the balance of power between government and the individual. Although
those rights are not absolute, any interference with those rights requires a compelling govern-
ment interest. However, the Constitution only protects those rights which are considered to be
fundamental and enduring. Federal and state laws are enacted to enhance those protections
and provide additional guidance as to the way government and individuals should act.
Treatment of privacy varies greatly across the world. From very strict control of personal
information throughout the European Union to the extensive government intervention in life
in China, expectations of privacy are very much defined by the society in question.
In addition to legal and social frameworks, some technical measures for privacy protection
exist. These solutions can be implemented at the personal, organizational, or even national
level to provide privacy protection.
This chapter will explore each of these areas in greater detail.
4.1 Privacy and the Constitution
The Constitution is the foundation for the US system of government and it establishes the
law of the land. Its purpose was not only to establish a working government, but to do so in a
way that would assure the essential liberties of all the people within its scope, as seen in the
beginning of the Preamble:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
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general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America
This section will explore to what extent, if any, the “Blessings of Liberty” clause encom-
passes the protection of privacy.
4.1.1 Is privacy in the Constitution?
The word privacy does not appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution of the United
States. However, this does not mean that privacy is a new value nor a right that is not
protected. In perhaps the most influential law review in modern history, Brandeis asserted
that the “right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life - the right to be left alone[44].”
In 1890, he was advocating privacy as a fundamental individual right by explaining how a
concept in the text encompassed or implied that right.
The job of the Supreme Court throughout history has been to interpret the meaning of
the Constitution as it is applies to certain situations, and in doing so they have found a right
to privacy implied by the text. The first mention of modern privacy came in the ruling of
NAACP v. Alabama. The Court ruled that the NAACP should not have to disclose its
membership list to the state of Alabama because the First amendment protects the “freedom
to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” Just seven years later, the Court found that
privacy was a “penumbral right” in Griswold v. Connecticut. The court reasoned that although
privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it is implicated in the First (free
speech), Third (protection from quartering soldiers), Fourth (search and seizure), and Fifth
(self-incrimination) amendments. Furthermore, the Ninth amendment allowed the Court the
flexibility to discover new rights as belonging to the people. In finding this right to privacy in
Griswold, the Court invalidated a law in Connecticut that banned contraceptives, saying that
the Constitution safeguarded individual automony for decisions that involve their bodies and
family.
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4.1.2 Judicial interpretations of privacy since Griswold
Since Griswold v. Connecticut, the right to privacy has become a standard facet of ju-
risprudence in the United States. However, its application and interpretation have been often
remolded with subsequent decisions. This section will highlight judicial interpretations of
privacy in order to try to provide the context of today’s understanding of this right.
Whalen v Roe In Whalen v Roe, the Court now recognized that the “zone of privacy”
protected by the Constitution was realized in two main forms:
1. Decisional privacy, or “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”
2. Informational privacy, or “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”
However, the Court has not really expounded on the informational privacy right any further,
although it has been used in many circuit courts[37].
Katz v United States Katz was the beginning of a revolution in Fourth amendment
law. The Court determined the wiretapping of a public phone booth, where Katz was making
a call, was a violation of the Fourth amendment. In its opinion, the Court said:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consitutionally protected.
In his famous concurrence in this case, Justin Harlan established the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test. This test is comprised of two inquiries:
1. Does the person exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of privacy?
2. Is that expectation one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”?
This test has been the fundamental basis for determining Fourth Amendment protection since
1967.
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US v Miller and Smith v Maryland These two cases established the third party
doctrine of modern privacy law. In each case the court held that financial records (Miller)
or pen registers (Smith) were not private information because it was willingly shared with a
third party. They reasoned that sharing information eroded Constitutional protection because
the individual, by exposing the information to others, could no longer have an expectation
of privacy. Although later the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 regulated the
use of pen registers, the third party doctrine established in these rulings still remains in use.
Unless otherwise protected by statute, any information voluntarily given to a third party does
not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Kyllo v US The police took pictures of a private home from the public space outside
using thermal imaging equipment. From these images, they determined that the homeowner
was growing marijuana plants and arrested him. The Court ruled that because the technology
was not available to the general public, the search was presumptively unreasonable.
4.2 Privacy Protection by the Legislature
The interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the Court allows the government much
freedom to gather information about individuals. The increasing digitization and sharing of
information is leading to a phenomenal amount of information being available about every
person who chooses to participate in US society. The various legislative bodies in the US have
recognized this and taken action to provide additional protections in response. This section
will describe many of the statutes that have been enacted to protect privacy.
4.2.1 Federal Statutes
Federal law does not holistically protect privacy, but instead does so as a patchwork of laws
protecting very specific interests. This section will describe the current privacy protections and
government powers regarding information.
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4.2.1.1 Financial Statutes
Various statutes have been enacted surrounding financial information.
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) - 1970 This act regulates consumer credit re-
porting agencies. It requires these agencies to make their records available to the subjects
of the records and allow individuals to correct information about themselves and regulates
disclosure of the information.
Bank Secrecy Act - 1970 This act compelled banks to start keeping records of certain
types of transactions to aid in detecting fraud and money laundering.
Right to Financial Privacy Act - 1978 This act was created to restrict access to the
records that were now kept due to the Bank Secrecy Act. In order to get bank records, the
government must have a court order or other formal request.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - 1999 This act requires financial institutions to notify cus-
tomers of their privacy policy. If the institution wants to disclose any nonpublic personal
information to nonaffiliated third parties, they must first notify the customer and allow them
the opportunity to opt-out. It also outlawed a practice known as pretexting, which is de-
fined as obtaining financial information about another person under the pretext of being that
individual.
4.2.1.2 Communications Statutes
Various statutes have been enacted regarding communications.
Omnibus Crime and Control Act of 1968 Also known as the Wiretap Act, it ex-
tended wiretap regulations to state officials and private actors. This established that a warrant
would be required, except for very specific circumstances, to obtain a wiretap.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) - 1978 This act established a separate
legal process for electronic surveillance being used to gather foreign intelligence. The standards
for obtaining probably cause are perhaps lesser than those of the Wiretap Act, but were greater
than the previous unchecked gathering of evidence for this purpose.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) - 1986 This act amended the
Wiretap Act to extend coverage to new forms of communication including cellular phones,
email, computer transmissions, and pagers. The ECPA restricts both the interception of
communications as well as the searching of stored communications (known as the Stored Com-
munications Act). A third component also limited the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices.
Privacy Act of 1974 The Privacy Act was passed in response to a report done by the
US Department of Health Education and Welfare, titled “Records, Computers, and the Rights
of Citizens.” The report recommended a set of Fair Information Practices to stop the problems
it observed, namely
An individual must increasingly give information about hiself to large and rel-
atively faceless institutions, for handling and use by strangers - unknown, unseen,
and, all too frequently, unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not even
known that an organization maintains a record about him. Often he may not see
it, much less contest its accuracy, control its dissemination, or challenge its use by
others[42].
The act responded to these concerns by regulating the collection and use of records by federal
agencies and allows individuals the rights to access and correct their personal information.
This Act is specifically targeted at restricting the ability of the federal government to amass
large databases of information about citizens.
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4.2.1.3 Other Acts
Several other types of information are protected via individual statutes. A few examples
are listed here.
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 Enacted in response to the uproar after
Supreme Court Justice nominee’s Robert Bork confirmation hearings, where people obtained
and used his video rental history as evidence to his character, this act forbids disclosure of
video rental or purchase information[36].
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 This act was the first and only direct
regulation of the states’ use of data at the federal level. It required that states must first obtain
a person’s consent prior to disclosing his motor vehicle record information. The practice of
selling those records had generated a large amount of revenue for many states prior to this act.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) This
act required that an individual must authorize the use and disclosure of his health information
when not used for treatment, payment, or health care operation. However, not all medical
records are covered. HIPAA only applies to records maintained by health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers. In addition, HIPAA provisions only require that
law enforcement have a subpoena, rather than a warrant, to obtain the information.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) The Patriot Act,
passed after September 11, 2001, updated the ECPA and FISA. It broadened the pen reg-
isters regulation to now include the addressing information on emails and IP addresses. It
increased the types of subscriber records that could be obtained from providers of communi-
cation services, like ISPs. It also broadened the purpose for which wiretaps under FISA could
be conducted, now only requiring that the wiretap be used in investigations where foreign
intelligence gathering is “a significant purpose.”
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4.2.2 Privacy in the States
The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act is a rare federal statute, at least at the current time,
because it regulates the ways in which the states can use information. Most other aspects of
state recordkeeping are up to the states to regulate themselves if they so choose.
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) website displays a state by state list
of different privacy areas and if those states protect information in that area. Table 4.1
contains the national data and data about five states: California, Florida, Iowa, Connecticut,
and Texax[28]. A “Y” means that the state has some law regulating that type of information.
An “N” means no such law exists.
Table 4.1 State Privacy Laws
State
Category US CA FL IA CT TX
Arrest Records N Y Y N Y N
Bank Records Y Y Y Y Y N
Cable TV Y Y N N Y N
Computer Crime Y Y Y Y Y Y
Credit Y Y Y Y Y Y
Criminal Justice Y Y Y Y Y N
Government data banks Y Y Y Y Y N
Employment Y Y Y Y Y N
Insurance Y Y Y N Y N
Mailing Lists Y Y Y Y Y N
Medical Y Y Y Y Y Y
Miscellaneous Y Y Y N Y N
Polygraph Results Y Y N Y Y Y
Privacy Statutes Y Y Y N N Y
Privileges N N N N Y Y
School Records Y Y Y Y Y Y
Social Security Numbers N N N N N N
Tax Records Y N N N N N
Telephone Solicitation Y Y Y Y Y Y
Testing N N Y Y Y N
Wiretaps Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cited from Epic.org
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4.3 International Privacy Law
The notion of privacy, and whether or not it warrants protection, differs internationally.
The European Union seems to be at the forefront of privacy protection. The United States
seems to fall in the middle of the spectrum, allowing more commercial use than many and less
government use than some. This section will summarize a few international regimes, focusing
primarily on the EU, whose protections are slowly influencing the rest of the international data
economy.
International privacy law began with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) Privacy Guidelines, which where largely based on the Fair Information









The Privacy Guidelines influenced much of the privacy policy adopted by the European Union.
4.3.1 Asia-Pacific countries
The more developed nations in this region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Korea, and Japan have fairly sophisticated privacy standards. Many of them follow a model
similar to the US, featuring heavier regulation of government use of information than commer-
cial use. However, other Asian-Pacific countries lack much privacy protection. For example,
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Singapore currently only uses voluntary, self-regulatory schemes. The People’s Republic of
China has only adopted indirect protections of privacy, and there is little sign that they intend
to reform to meet EU standards[43].
4.3.2 European Union
The first directive on data privacy (Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data -
also known as the EU Directive), is a comprehensive law that protects personal information
maintained by a broad range of entities. Joe Reidenberg said
The background and underlying philosophy of the European Union Directive
differs in important ways from that of the United States... The United States
has, in recent years, left the protections of privacy to markets rather than law. In
contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in fundamental
human rights[31].
It is very influential internationally because it prohibits the transfer of personal data to coun-
tries that do not provide adequate levels of privacy protection.
4.4 Technical Means for Privacy Protection
Three basic categories of technical solutions have been proposed to help protect privacy:
identity hiding, information hiding, and information minimization. Each of these will be
discussed in the following subsections.
4.4.1 Identity Hiding
Various techniques for maintaining privacy involve some form of anonymity or pseudonym
as a way to hide the identity of the subject. These methods protect privacy by making it hard
for anyone with the data to connect it to an actual person. Some examples of existing identity
hiding technologies or methods are:
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• Tor, which is an anonymizing routing technology
• Proxies, which allow anonymous web surfing
• Anonymous remailers, which hide where email originated
• Avoiding registered accounts
• Deleting or not accepting cookies, which are often used to track user actions
• Using a NAT, which hides IP addresses
• Data aggregation, which allows information to be collected without identifying individ-
uals
• Obfuscation or chaffing, which entails adding random or misleading information to con-
ceal or obscure actual behavior
Tor, proxies, remailers are ways for a user to attempt to remain anonymous in web surfing
and other online activities. In fact, Tor was developed by and is used by the government for
use in intelligence gathering, in instances where the web site it visits must not know that it
was visited by a government agency[46]. These technologies keep the identity of the user secret
from the entity it visits, as well as anyone else watching, by not revealing the location where
the traffic originated However, this does not prevent the users from identifying themselves by
the content they send.
Data aggregation and obfuscation are commonly used by people who mine data to try and
keep the anonymity of the data contributors. This is common practice in research and other
areas where the identity of single users is not important for the analysis.
As described in the previous section in the discussion of the inference problem, it does not
require a name or a social security number to uniquely identify a person. Figure 4.1, which
was created by Greg Conti in Googling Security, shows a hypothetical diagram depicting the
ways in which a subject’s activity is correlated[5]:
Basic identity hiding techniques can help stop this from occuring, or at least limit its
effects. However, many of the services available online require a user to identify himself in
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Figure 4.1 Correlating User Activity, by G. Conti
order to participate. Meaningfully using email, online banking, and various other services
without allowing the activity to be linked to the same individual would take a great deal of
individual effort and still be likely to fail.
4.4.2 Information Hiding
Information hiding refers to ways to conceal information. Techniques for accomplishing
this are:
• Encryption, which will change the content to a (presumably) unreadable format, except
to people who know or can break the code. Encryption can be used for most types of
information, like emails or the information stored on a personal computer
• Hidden partitions, which are a way to attempt to create a secret location on a computer
for information that an individual would prefer not be discovered
• Refraining from accessing personal information in public places. For example, do not
check personal email or banking at work. The workplace has the authority to watch
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whatever its employees are doing online and could be logging the traffic.
4.4.3 Information Minimization
This technique involves only generating information that is necessary, as well as removing
it once it is no longer needed. This could include:
• Content filtering during web browsing and disallowing third party content such as banner
ads, referrer values, and web bugs
• Deleting cookies frequently
• Deleting browsing history
• Performing complete deletes, or “zeroing” digital information once it is no longer needed
4.5 Problems with the Current Protections
Right now, technology and practice in collecting and sharing information is by far outpacing
technology and law to police privacy. While the increased availability of information can have
great benefits to individuals, to companies, and to government, personal privacy is still a
legitimate concern, and one in danger of being extinguished if this trend continues unchecked.
4.5.1 Why can the market not take care of privacy?
It is possible that technical advancement and market forces will work in a way that will
favor privacy, just as it is possible that those forces will continue to act to demolish privacy.
If a large number of consumers demanded privacy and were willing to pay for it, the market
would presumably solve the problem. However, users at the moment like their online services
to be free, even at the cost of some privacy, and marketing companies are willing to pay for
those services in return for the information. Until that paradigm changes, it is not likely that
the lack of privacy protection will be remedied without government intervention. Targeted
marketing provides strong incentive for companies to ensure the current system stays in place.
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4.5.2 Why can technology not take care of privacy?
Technology seems to always be a cycle, never an end. Not long after new protections are
created, someone finds a way to beat them and gain access. Then another protection will
be developed, and so on. Some information will always need to be shared and ultimately be
associated with real people; society in the forseeable future will demand continued intercon-
nectedness. Technology will play an important role, both in the protection and the destruction,
of privacy - but it will never be a final solution.
4.5.3 So it is up to the government
The need for privacy protection is more than just a fear that the government will turn into
the infamous Big Brother, but rather it is about the balance of power between the rights of
the individual and the government. Although enforcement of the law and protecting the safety
of the citizens are important goals, those aims do not automatically trump the rights of the
individual citizen. To protect this balance, the Constitution requires that there be a reason
for the government to search or seize the papers or effects of an individual.
However, that statement has several ambiguities which must be addressed in its application.
The new role that digital information is playing in society and the ways in which it is different
from traditional physical evidence have only exacerbated the problem. The important questions
that must be answered are:
1. What does it mean to search digital information? Must it be a human reading the data,
or does computer analysis suffice?
2. How can, if it all, digital information be seized?
3. What makes obtaining digital information reasonable? Is it defined by the way in which
the information is obtained, some characteristic of the information itself, some combina-
tion of the two, or something else entirely?
Each of these questions implicates a challenge for the interpretation of the privacy protec-
tion under the Fourth amendment. The following paragraphs will describe the way in which
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the current legal landscape looks in the terms of these three questions.
Searches Most of the jurisprudence in privacy is actually the determination of whether
or not a search occured. For a search to have occured, the information obtained must have
been gotten unreasonably. The common test used here is if the person had a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” for that information. It appears as though this expectation exists in
one of three forms:
• The information was created, stored, and used only inside the home, thereby invoking
the traditional protections of the private sphere of the home
• The information cannot be obtained by any common means and therefore cannot be
expected to be ascertained, as in Kyllo
• Society recognizes the information as protected, as this expectation is recognized by the
Court
Seizures The most common legal definition is that a seizure occurs when a person’s
“possessory interest” is affected by the action. Because the copying of digital data can occur
without the inconvenience (or even the knowledge) of the owner of the information, digital
information is almost never found to be seized.
Reasonableness When applied to the scenario of obtaining third party information, the
only real inquiry into reasonableness is whether or not the entity in question went through
the proper legal channels, as required by statute, to obtain the protected information. If not
covered by statute, there is no reasonableness to consider because there is no search.
4.6 Outcomes
The situation created by the legal and technical circumstances described in this chapter
is a system in which the government now pays the private sector to do exactly what they
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themselves were prohibited from doing - amassing large databases of personal information to
be stored until needed by the government. To summarize what occured:
• The computer and networking technology made it easier to to collect and share informa-
tion
• This also allowed data mining technology, which then allowed new knowledge to be
obtained from that information, which is useful both in private and public endeavors
• The mass adoption of such technologies, fueled both by legislation and society, led to
massive digital dossiers being available of every person
• The legislature, concerned about unchecked power, passed laws trying to restrict govern-
ment ability to collect massive amounts of information, but not regulating the flow and
use of information otherwise
• To fill the desire for government to continue to take advantage of these technologies, data
aggregation companies arose, now acting in the exact same role to hold mined information
for the government to search at their will
These companies, like Choicepoint, Acxiom, LexisNexis, Docusearch, and many others are
filling the role of collecting information and selling it almost completely unregulated. No
longer is information protected simply by being infeasible to collect - it is all being collected
and stored for later use. These actions are not illegal in and of themselves, but the current
system poses several dangers to the individual.
Lack of awareness of what information about themselves is being collected
Most typical users assume that information they choose to give to an organization will be used
solely by that organization. For example, many people choose to become members of grocery
store frequent shopper programs, which use savings cards. When the individual purchases items
at the store, their card is scanned by the employee checking them out, and some discounts are
applied to their items. However, in exchange for some savings, the individual is allowing the
grocery store to associate that person with the items that he buys. People already give up
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some privacy to this information each time they shop, because the other people in the store,
particularly the checkout person, can see exactly what is in their cart. However, what the
individual does not realize is that the company can compile that information over time, which
can reveal very personal information (the inference problem). In addition, that grocery store
may choose to sell the food profiles to other companies, who then combine it with information.
Hypothetically, that information could be used to infer other pieces of information like religion,
any changes in his life, or many other more personal facts or assumptions which are much larger
than simply what food he ate.
In addition, the information can often be freely traded and aggregated many times, so the
individual will probably never know who has it, how they use it, and if it is being sold to the
government in some way.
Lack of awareness when or why information about them is being gathered or
analyzed Historically, a person who was under investigation by the police tended to know
about it. The police would have to talk to the suspect himself or people that knew him, who
could likely tell the individual. Transparency in this regard helps ensure that the police do not
abuse their investigatory power. However, with data mining, the subject never knows and can
never tell if he is being unfairly targeted.
Inability to correct erroneous information Because the individual does not know
everyone who possesses his information, it is impossible to find errors and correct them. Even
if he knew the errors existed, it can be impossible to trace the trail of the personal information
between the myriad of data miners who buy and sell personal information millions of times a
day. That erroneous information about the individual exists in digital form on the internet,
and it can no longer be recalled nor contained.
This is perhaps the most widely recognized shortcoming in today’s society due to the
prevelence of identity theft. When identity theft takes place, the person whose identity was
used often experiences problems with erroneous information on his credit report, due to the
fraudulent activity. However, getting this information corrected is a lengthy, expensive process
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that is still not always effective at clearing the innocent party. It has been reported to take
150 to 500 hours of time and up to $3000 to fix an identity theft problem[32].
Inability to remain anonymous in daily activities The idea of privacy in public may
sound counter-intuitive, but it is an assumption of daily life today. Everyday people walk out
of their homes to go about their daily business. Most, if not all, realize that the casual passerby
may notice what time they leave and what they are wearing. That information is external and
public because it occurs in a public place. However, individuals expect that they will not be
watched by the same person every day, giving the habitual observer insights into the habits and
personal life of the individual that the casual observer simply cannot determine during isolated
instances of notice. The idea of being repeatedly watched by someone is intrusive and perhaps
uncomfortable, but the hypothetical can go even further. Now suppose that the individual
lives in a city where there are cameras on every street corner that attempt to capture crime.
Now the details of the individual’s comings and goings around the entire town are recorded
and aggregated. Technical improvements in facial recognition are starting to make it possible
for the people collecting the footage from those cameras to identify individuals in each camera
shot and then follow the individual’s movements throughout the town.
Inability to choose which behaviors are worth the privacy risk The previous
examples illustrate that even traditionally public activities are being used to collect massive
amounts of information about private individuals in a way that was not possible before. Many
individuals choose to put much of their private information out for public use, such as people
who use new personal networking technologies like Facebook or Myspace to share details about
themselves and their lives with many others. However, many people also choose not to be so
open about their information. They may prefer to remain anonymous in their shopping and
other personal habits. Unfortunately, privacy is not really an option anymore. It is increasingly
difficult, probably impossible, to participate in today’s digital society without relinquishing
control of some personal information to a third party, and thereby making it available to the
government.
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CHAPTER 5. Discussion of Proposed Solutions
This chapter will examine various proposed solutions for the privacy problems described in
the last chapters. Then, it will attempt to normalize all the different options and compare them




A 2D Stakeholder/Method Perspective Model will be introduced to evaluate each of the
solutions. The model I propose is based in large part from the work of Timothy Terrell and
Anne Jacobs. In their analysis of two Supreme Court decisions with privacy impacts, they
formulated a four square framework for evaluating the philosophies underlying judicial inter-
pretations of the case involving privacy[39]. It was proposed as a means to better understand
the way in which the competing interests were evaluated and weighed, which would also help
in preparing arguments. It proposed two ways of categorizing the perspective of the opinion:
1. Moral philosophy, relating to the concept of fairness
2. Political philosophy, relating to the concept of justice
These categorizations led to four different combinations of these two perspectives describing
the emphasis on which an argument is based, as seen in Figure 5.1[39]:
I propose to use a similar dual-dichotomy approach as a way of comparing the fundamental
emphases of the solutions being evaluated. This approach will evaluate the solution in two
ways:
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Figure 5.1 Reasoning Analysis
1. It will determine the stakeholder perspective, individual or societal, taken as the most
important
2. Then it will evaluate the method perspective, ends or means, that is emphasized
To perform the comparative analysis, each of these evaluations will be placed on an axis
and used to graph the points where various solutions would fall on these dichotomies. The
model will be used to score the relative weight of these dichotomies on a scale of -5 to 5. Table
5.1 shows the guidelines used in assigning the scores.
At the end of each proposed solution description, a score for each criteria will be assigned
and the rationale for that score will be explained.
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Table 5.1 Solution Scoring
Score Stakeholder Perspective Methodology Analysis
-5 Inquiry hinges solely on the rights of
the individual
Inquiry hinges solely on way data is
obtained
-3 Strong favoring of rights of individ-
ual
Strong favoring of determining way
data is obtained
-1 Inquiry favors slightly the individual
over societal interest
Inquiry favors way data is obtained
slightly
0 Equally weighs individual and soci-
etal interests
Equally weighs the way of gathering
data with the end informational goal
1 Slightly emphasizes social perspec-
tive
Slightly emphasizes end goal over
the method of collection
3 Strong favoring of societal perspec-
tive
Strong favoring of end goal over
method of collection
5 Inquiry hinges solely on the societal
interest
The information obtained, not the
methodology, is the sole factor
5.1.2 Judicial Solutions
5.1.2.1 Restricted Third Party Doctrine (R3PD)
This approach would have the judiciary restrict third party doctrine to only apply to
information deliberately conveyed in order that its content be used[11, 12]. Beyond that
point, it would involve evaluating privacy claims on a case-by-case basis because it would be
impossible to differentiate among all the possible types of information and distinctions in the
way they are shared. Henderson cited the New Mexico appellate court, which rejected the
third party doctrine as it currently stands, in saying
In all cases that invoke [our Fourth Amendment analog], the ultimate question is
reasonableness. We avoid bright-line, per se rules in determining reasonableness;
instead, we consider the facts of each case.
The main argument in this view is that the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ of a subject
is not automatically diminished by the sharing of this information with a third party, as the
Court had declared in Smith v Maryland. Some state courts have found that society has come
to expect a certain level of privacy in third party information, which may then invoke the a
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reasonable expectation of privacy.
He proposed a set of factors used to determine reasonableness[11]:
1. The purpose of the disclosure
2. The personal nature of the information
3. The amount of information
4. The expectations of the disclosing party
5. The understanding of the third party
6. Postivite law guarantees of privacy
7. Government need
8. Personal recollections
9. Changing social norms and technologies
In addition he emphasized that some factors should not be used in anlysis and listed the
following factors as irrelevant:
1. The form of the information
2. The ‘good citizen’ motivation of a third party
3. The government’s method of acquisition
4. Expectation created by police conduct
Score The items enumerated in this list explicitly include government need and char-
acteristics of the person involved. However, many more of the criterion focus on the impact
on the individual. Stakeholder Perspective = -2 The criteria listed specifically discount char-
acteristics like the form of the information and the method of acquisition, while focusing on
expectations of privacy between the parties. This shows a specific emphasis on the ends, rather
than the means of collection. Method Perspective = 3
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5.1.2.2 Informational Access Interpretation (IAI)
Manish Kumar suggests the Fourth amendment should be interpreted in respect to the
inforation access[19]. He argues that it is not disclosure to public that makes information
unprotected, but the ability of the public to meaningfully access and interpret that information
that matters. He makes this argument primarily in the context of email, the contents of which
are often publicly available to the ISP but are not needed as part of the business record in the
way that email header information is needed. Therefore, because the ISP itself does not access
the content, much like a post office could but does not open mail, the information should be
protected.
Score The key analytical factor is the ability of the public to meaningfully access and
interpret information, instead of an inquiry into the actions or invasions of the individual’s
realm. Stakeholder Perspective = 3 The approach specifically asks the question: ‘Does the
government have to employ special means not available to the public to access the allegedly
private information[19]?’ If that answer is yes, it is a search. Method Perspective = -5
5.1.2.3 Seizure of Intangible Property (SIP)
Paul Ohm argues that the concept of what constitutes a seizure should be reverted to the
’dominion and control’ definition rather than the current standard, which is characterized as
‘meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in ... property[26].’ He argues
that this area of the law has not been pursued since the 1920s because in typical cases, before
something can be seized a search must occur. Therefore, the definition of gathering information
using new technology has hinged upon whether or not obtaining that information incurred a
search, not whether gathering it is a seizure. However, advances in technology are making
it possible to gather digital information without entering on any property and even without
the user’s notice. He argues that copying digital data dimishes the individual’s dominion and
control of the information, even though it does not interfere with their ability to possess the
original copy of the information.
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Score This perspective solely takes into account the perspective of the individual, relying
only on his ‘dominion and control’ of his information. Stakeholder Perspective = -5 The method
of obtaining information is not the issue; instead the concern is the effect that obtaining that
information has on the individual’s rights. Therefore, the emphasis is strongly on the ends,
rather than the means, of the collection. Method Perspective = 4
5.1.2.4 Human Access (HA)
Orin Kerr argues that the Fourth amendment regulates the flow of information between the
individual and the government by limiting the access to information for human observation[17].
He stipulates that this means:
• Once information has been exposed to human observation, it is a search
• Copying data should not be a seizure, but copied data should be treated the same as the
original in obtaining ‘reasonableness’ to search it. This means that changing the location
and the format of the information should not inherently change its level of protection.
• This regulation does not limit the ability to understand information that it can access.
Therefore, encryption does not incur a higher standard of protection. If this information
can be accessed, then they have to right to try to break the encryption[16].
Score He argues that individual privacy is simply the byproduct of a larger societal goal:
regulating government access to information. Stakeholder Perspective = 2 The emphasis in
Kerr’s analysis is exactly what must occur to constitute a search or seizure. However, the
emphasis on the impact of human observation implies that the end goal of maintaining privacy
from agents of government is more important than the way in which that knowledge is reached.
To explain this dissonance, I argue that Kerr implicates this end goal by saying that the purpose
of the Fourth amendment is to regulate flow, and to do this he wants to regulate the way in
which that access can be achieved. Method Perspective = -1
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5.1.2.5 Plain Concealment (PC)
Jim Harper argues that the entirety of electronic records today are so revealing that they
should be protected as the ‘modern iteration of papers and effects[10].’ In his interpretation,
this would mean that concealing information from the general public is effectively concealing
information from government. In doing so, a person would not have to exhibit any expectation
for its protection, because the Constitution never requires an expectation of a right for it to
be protected. Therefore, privacy would be a question of fact, rather than subjective analysis
of societal expectation. This paradigm would be called ‘plain conealment,’ and very similar to
‘plain view’ exceptions in analysis.
Score Harper largely discounted the so-called ‘chilling effects’ of government surveillance
on societal feelings, instead relying on individual rights and their efforts or happening to
plainly conceal their information. Stakeholder Perspective = -5 In making the attainment
of information a fact-based analysis, Harper is inquiring into how exactly that information is
obtained. If the individual had concealed the information, then attaining it must have required
some kind of bypass. Method Perspective = -5
5.1.2.6 Long View (LV)
Lerner and Mulligan described an idea of taking the ‘long view’, or looking past the caveats
of the current situation and asking two fundamental questions to determine the long term effects
of the decision[14]:
1. Does the record which is held by the third party reveal information about activities that
are taking place inside the home and would not be able to be otherwise obtained without
physcial trespass into the home?
2. Is the consumer lacking any real choice about whether to create such records or an
opportunity to choose to maintain them in the home?
If the answer to both these questions is yes, then obtaining this information should be protected
by the Fourth amendment.
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Score The two questions proposed in the framework itself makes scoring this example
incredibly simple. The first question frames the information obtained as a characteristic of
the individual, not societal expectation or influence. Stakeholder Perspective = -5 The second
question does not rely directly on how the information was obtained, but in what options the
subject had to stop its release to the public. In taking this into consideration, the analysis
is considering the mandatory loss of privacy of the individual before the way in which the
information is collected. Method Perspective = 3 It may also be argued that the overarching
emphasis of this model is societal-ends focused, rather than individual-ends. Although I agree
that the societal-ends seems to be a relevant concern in the explanation for the solution, the
method for applying the questions would be emphatically more focused on the individual.
5.1.2.7 Proportionality Principle (PP)
Slobogin proposed another way to interpret the societal expectation of privacy from intru-
sion in his articulation of the proportionality principle. He thought that the intrusiveness of
knowing information is a characteristic of the information, not how it is obtained. Therefore,
the level of justification for search and seizure should be proportional to the intrusiveness of
the information[35].
Score This perspective attempts a direct balance between the perspective of the individ-
ual and the need of law enforcement. In advocating proportionality, he is making a direct at-
tempt to balance the two stakeholders. Stakeholder Perspective = 0 As part of proportionality,
the method of gathering information is important, but as that method is deemed appropriate
by the ends. Again, the attempt was to balance the two, but with a slight emphasis on the
ends. Method Perspective = 1
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5.1.3 Legislative Solutions
5.1.3.1 Privacy Gap (PG)
The Center for Democracy and Technology proposes adapting the Privacy Act of 1974 to
include government use of commercial databases[29]. Essentially, it argues that the government
should not be able to rely on information from commercial databases unless they are subject
to data quality and reliability standards.
Score Although the concept of individual privacy is hinted at throughout the analysis,
the view here is from the impact of increasing government power in terms of its information
collection abilities and the way that will impact society. Stakeholder Perspective = 3 This
article advocates exploring very specific ways to regulate the gathering and use of information.
It recommends passing legislation that will govern exactly how government agents can obtain
information about individuals. Method Perspective = -3
5.1.3.2 Regulate Personal Data (RPD)
In his article about data brokers and law enforcement, Chris Hoofnagle argues that histor-
ically, the legislature found it more important to protect against government intrusion rather
than commercial use of personal data[13]. However, unchecked, the commercial entities have
been using that distinction to collect the data and sell it to law enforcement. Hoofnagle
recommends four changes to privacy legislation:
1. Minimize data collection
2. Remove distinctions between government and commercial collectors
3. Address emerging privacy issues with the exposure of personal information in public
records
4. Amend the Privacy Act to apply to the sale of information to the government in the
situations where the government is not allowed to collect it
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Score Hoofnagle focuses on the role of privacy law to balance the power between individ-
uals and the government. He also mentions that public records, which will lead to numerous
individual privacy problems as they become digitized, serve as a way for society to observe the
actions of officials - thereby increasing the ability of society to keep government abuse of power
in check. His perspective recognizes the societal value in the issues, but strongly advocates
increased protection of the individual. Stakeholder Perspective = -2 He advocates specific
limitations on the ways information can be collected and made public by the government (via
public records like court documents). These foci rely on regulating the means of information
collection. Method Perspective = -2
5.1.3.3 Degree of Accessibility (DA)
In Access and Aggregation, Solove is exploring the specific risks that governmental public
records pose to privacy[36]. Although he frames his opening hypothetical situation in reference
to individual information, he tends to refer to reforming public conceptions of privacy to mean
increased control and limited access, not absolute secrecy. Solove argues that information does
not have to be entirely private or not at all, but instead involves an expectation of a certain
degree of accessibility. Specifically, he examined the way that the release and digitization of
public records introduces a concern about the structure of information flow in society. He rec-
ommended nationalizing public records law and restricting some types of personal information
from being published to the general public.
Score Solove’s emphasis is slightly more about changing societal views of protection of
personal information than the personal protection itself. By instituting a regime of degrees
of accessibility, his solution would reduce the social reliance and acceptance of freely available
personal information via public records. Stakeholder Perspective = 1 This article advocates
exploring very specific ways to regulate the gathering and use of information. It recommends
passing legislation that will govern exactly how government agents can share and obtain infor-
mation about individuals. Method Perspective = -3
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5.1.3.4 Opt-In (OI)
Some current privacy legislation requires that companies allow individuals, if there is an
option, to opt-out of the sharing of their information with nonaffiliated third parties. This
process can be difficult, confusing, and many people are unaware that it even exists. Some
proponents argue that customers should be able to opt-in to data sharing for additional benefits
rather than be made to opt-out.
Score Advocates of this view primarily focus on the fact that individuals tend not to
understand or choose to participate in opt-out systems. Instituting opt-in would make an
individual’s default status as protected, but the system of sharing information in society would
not necessarily have to be impacted at all. Stakeholder Perspective = -3 The opt-in system is
a more ends-focused approach because it is enacted to make protecting personal information
easier for individuals by reducing the need for action taken by the individual. It does not
change the way that protected and unprotected information can be collected or handled, just
simply reverses which lists would be kept by private companies. Method Perspective = 3
5.1.4 Societal Solutions
5.1.4.1 Pay for Privacy (PfP)
This scheme would create a business model where consumers interested in protecting pri-
vacy in commercial transactions could pay to not have their information revealed.
Score The pay for privacy scheme would allow individual users to choose the level of
privacy they would prefer and weigh that value amongst others like cost or functionality.
Although this is very similar to OI, it has greater societal emphasis than OI because this model
relies on societal views to influence the emergence of this system. Stakeholder Perspective =
-1 This approach implies that companies who would have the power to collect would refrain
in order to respect a user’s privacy. The focus is not on regulating types of access, but on
affording levels of privacy. Therefore, the primary focus of this model is the end goal, not the
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method. Method Perspective = 3
5.1.4.2 Competitive Advantage (CA)
This scheme suggests that as privacy becomes a more important concern of consumers,
companies will begin to attempt to distinguish themselves by placing a higher value on privacy
of personal information. An interesting caveat of changes like the type that could evolve from
privacy as a marketable value is that companies that begin to self-enact additional privacy
restrictions could impact other organizations to do the same. As the EU Directive has caused
companies from outside the EU to conform to its standards in order to do business with those
companies under the directive, fostering a competitive privacy market within the US could do
the same.
Score The approach takes a very total view of society and the market and views additional
personal privacy as merely a commodity. Stakeholder Perspective = 4 Like the pay for privacy
model, the primary focus would be on the end goal of providing various levels of privacy, not
regulating specific means of collection. Method Perspective = 3
5.1.5 Technical Solutions
The previous chapter identified three basic categories of technical solutions have been pro-
posed to help protect privacy: identity hiding (IDH), information hiding (INH), and informa-
tion minimization (IM). Every technology introduced provides the means to protect informa-
tion, so each item in this category will have a Method Perspective score of -5.
Identity Hiding Score Hiding identity involves separating each individual from infor-
mation about them, whether it is their browsing history or anonymity in a political poll.
Stakeholder Perspective = -5
Information Hiding Score Hiding information not only protects the individual interest
in keeping their information private, but also a societal interest in protecting a reasonable
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balance of power between government need to police and individual autonomy. Although most
of these technologies will have an impact primarily at the individual level, their existence has
some social implications. Stakeholder Perspective = -4
Data Minimization Score Much like information hiding, these techniques attempt to
protect the individual from oppression or interference from government. In doing so, it will
provide some potential for societal benefit. Stakeholder Perspective = -4
5.2 Model Outcome Analysis
Determining which, if any, of these solutions should be enacted is a difficult decision, and
not one that everyone is able to make. For example, individuals have little control over the
drafting and passing of legislation, but they can contact their representatives and vote for
people who are dedicated to protecting privacy. The only individuals who can enact new
judicial approaches are judges; however, changes in societal values toward privacy and the use
of information could increase the likelihood of a change in judicial review of the topic.
This thesis does not aim to recommend a particular solution or course of action as the ‘best’
to implement. To do so would require determining the appropriate balance of emphasis on
different values, which is subject to personal opinion and interpretation. Instead, it hopes to
provide a comparative analysis of various solutions to illuminate the types of changes that could
be implemented and the effects it may have. In doing so, this may also prove to provide helpful
insight into the way that new developments with privacy implications should be examined prior
to their enactment.
This resulted in the following comparative scoring of the solutions, shown both in Table
5.2 and Figure 5.2
From the table and graph, it is possible to make several observations about the grouping
of the data points:
1. Only one item plotted on the graph was anywhere near the data point ‘Now’, which is
indicating the current interpretation of privacy when this model is applied. The nearby
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Table 5.2 2D Stakeholder/Method Perspective Scores Table






















item was CA, referring to the societal measure of allowing competitive advantage. Every
other solution proposed was in a different quadrent.
2. All the technical solutions are very focused at the individual/means level.
3. All but one of the legislative solutions were at roughly the same means level as well.
Although the legislative aims varied in individual and societal emphasis, the regulation
took place at a very detailed level invoking the means of collecting and using information.
4. Judicial interpretations varied wildly in data point placement.
5. Only one point was on an axis, and very few were close. Most solutions strongly favor
one perspective over the other.
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Figure 5.2 2D Stakeholder/Method Perspective Data Plot
5.3 Implications of the Findings
Analyzing the proposed solutions, which attempt to solve the same issues in different ways,
revealed interesting trends as well as potential gaps. This section will attempt to interpret the
deeper meanings of the plot analysis provided in the previous section. The key findings are:
1. Some combination of legislative and technical solutions will be the most likely candidates
for regulating the means by which information is collected and analyzed. However, these
solutions will be ever evolving because technology and society will continue to change.
However, the nature of law and technology is that they are often effective at incremental
change. Laws and technologies are capable of, but rarely do, producing radical change.
Instead, they will be the slow way that checks and balances between the individual and
government are enacted.
58
2. The potential impact of a judicial paradigm shift in interpreting the Fourth amendment
could be huge and very unpredictable. The many methodologies evaluated in this paper
would all revamp some aspect of Fourth amendment interpretation, primarily in either
the interpretation of the third party doctrine, the reasonable expectation of privacy
definition of a search, and the possessory interest definition of a seizure. Any of these
changes will have sweeping implications in the direction that society is taking. Any
of these changes will likely lead to a massive restructuring of government information
attainment strategies. In addition, altering the third party doctrine could destroy or
severely reduce the exploding information aggregation and sales market, particularly for
those companies that target law enforcement and government agencies as their primary
customers.
3. Solutions that balance these competing interests, individual versus society and means
versus end, make up only a small percentage of the proposed solutions. Many of these
solutions very strongly favored one quadrant instead of having balance on either di-
chotomy. Does this mean that we must choose one set of values over the other? To some
degree, I believe we do. The only solution that was on an axis was Slobogin’s Proportion-
ality Principle doctrine. The problem with this doctrine would be its implementation.
Because it does not settle the struggle between the two opposing forces (government and
individuals) this battle will be rehashed repeatedly as the Court attempts to interpret
the complex technical, legal, and societal factors. This solution is what I would call a
high-risk, high-reward. It has the potential to give the Court the flexibility to inter-
pret each situation in a complete and meaningful way to determine reasonableness under
the Fourth amendment. However, because it is so ambiguous, this solution is also the




Performing a comparative analysis of all the proposed solutions across different disciplines
helped shed light solution landscape and the ways in which privacy could be impacted in
the future. The 2D Stakeholder/Method Perspective data plot clearly depicted the solution
landscape and provided useful means to look for new information. With the data points, I
was able to spot trends or lack thereof, look for weaknesses, and hypothesize about the future.
Hopefully this analysis will serve as a useful framework to evaluate potential solutions and
provide a way to ponder potential new solutions that have not yet been considered.
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